DHS Issues Draft National Cargo Security Strategy Paper

Based on industry feedback, DHS states that it expects its draft strategy paper will be revised and enhanced. (See today's ITT, 05012610, for BP summary of the Homeland Security Institute's executive summary of comments it received as a result of the Homeland Security Cargo Summit.)

In its draft white paper, DHS states that its mission with regard to cargo security is to provide the most effective security program possible while maximizing the targeted use of available resources and without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.

According to DHS, to accomplish this mission, it must:

enhance the physical security of the supply chain;

use information and intelligence to target and identify high risk cargo;

inspect 100% of the designated high risk cargo;

work in partnership with business and the international community; and

enhance the efficiency of the international cargo transportation system.

DHS states that its draft strategy paper takes into account the recommendations from the Departmental Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of Customs and Border Protection and Related Homeland Security Functions (COAC), knowledge gained from Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), DHS analysis, and various industry outreach efforts.

DHS' Proposed Strategic Framework is Comprised of Eight Priority Objectives

Based on the threats, vulnerabilities, and conditions identified in its draft strategy paper, DHS proposes a strategic framework comprised of eight priority objectives:

Detection equipment to support a zero tolerance policy for WMEs. The number one strategic objective for cargo security must be the interdiction of a weapon of mass effect (WME) at U.S. borders. A zero tolerance policy will require more rapid deployment of the next generation of radiation (and eventually chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)) detection equipment at all U.S. marine, land, and air ports.

Inspection of high risk cargo earlier in supply chain. DHS states that more effective data analysis for identifying high-risk cargo for inspection earlier in the supply chain should be implemented. Since it is currently not technologically feasible to inspect 100% of cargo, DHS must continue to make decisions on which shipments to inspect based on the level of relative risk associated with individual cases. According to DHS, meeting this strategic objective requires the rapid build-out of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) platform for targeting and selectivity across modes, and as a basis for domestic targeting of air cargo on passenger carriers. In addition, DHS must determine how best to integrate knowledge of shipment-specific supply chain actions currently not covered by existing reporting requirements.

Promote secure stuffing procedures, mandate high security mechanical seals. Based on knowledge gained from OSC, DHS is exploring means of promoting secure stuffing procedures in a manner visible to DHS on a shipment-specific basis. Similarly, and in order to improve the ability to assess whether a container was tampered with en-route, DHS will, as a short-term step, mandate the use of high security mechanical seals on all in-bound containers. As solutions become commercially available to detect container intrusion and the highest consequence threats, particularly WMEs, requirements for their use should be integrated into DHS cargo security programs. This should include a requirement, based on DHS performance standards, for a Container Security Device (CSD) within 3-5 years, based on the outcome of the S&T Advance Container Security Device program.

Transition voluntary practices to mandatory requirements. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), and other voluntary programs provide DHS with a degree of confidence that shipments within the program present less risk, and serve as an effective test bed for new security practices. At the same time, limited enforcement of non-regulatory programs reduces DHS' ability to rely on them as a robust measure of security. As voluntary programs evolve and mature, DHS should be evaluating the transition of these voluntary practices to mandatory requirements as necessitated by threat and vulnerability.

Security best practices for domestic cargo. Domestic surface (rail and truck) and maritime (short shipping/inland barge movements) cargo security presents unique challenges. Although the establishment of a regulatory structure may be a long-term goal, DHS must begin to improve the security of domestic shipments by establishing best practices and working closely with industry to ensure adoption. This would include leveraging programs and pilots into a comprehensive domestic security plan, and will be consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

Technology improvements. DHS requires a more robust program plan and better definition of user requirements to set long-term goals for technology improvements that will enable the other strategic objectives in this paper.

Protocols for resumption of trade after an attack. In the event of an attack on ports or related supply chain infrastructure individual or systematic shutdowns may be required. DHS agencies should begin the development of protocols for resumption of trade as part of its broader effort to establish a regional framework for contingency planning and ensuring trade lanes are restored as quickly as possible if the U.S. sustains an attack on supply chain infrastructure.

Continued industry outreach. DHS should continue to work with federal advisory committees, including the COAC and others, as well as with the broader trade community through forums such as the Summit, to solicit input on programmatic initiatives and to test the strategic assumptions of the DHS cargo security framework.

DHS National Cargo Security Strategy White Paper (Version 1.8) available at

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin%2FImagesJC%2FDHS%20Conference%20Dec%202004/National%5FCargo%5FSecurity%5FStrategy%5FWhite%5FPaper%2Epdf.